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Theme: One of the desired effects of the Madrid bombing seems to have been to splinter 
the Western alliance. The allies must see through the trap, acknowledge mistakes, 
produce a stricter definition of the threat of terrorism and create a new strategy for fighting 
its sources. 
 
Summary: The aftermath of the Madrid attacks showed that the US and its European 
allies are deeply divided over the role of Iraq in the war on Islamic terrorism. European 
mass opinion –unlike America’s– sees the two as completely separate problems and 
America’s actions as counterproductive to the war on terror. To keep differences over Iraq 
from ungluing the Western coalition, it is important to restate the definition of causes and 
nature of terrorism and to agree on basic principles. The outlines of continued cooperation 
are clear: the US and Europe share the sense that Islamist terrorism represents a 
potentially catastrophic threat, they cooperate closely on stopping the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction and they are willing to go to great lengths –including the use of 
military force– to prevent future attacks. 
 
 
Analysis: Differences between the US and Europe in the past few turbulent years have 
often been explained through the prism of September 11. Europeans cannot possibly 
understand Washington’s desire to change the status quo, the argument goes, because 
they do not share the emotional trauma that fuels America’s foreign and security policies. 
The logic of the argument dictated that if a similar attack took place on European soil, the 
allies’ views would realign. 
 
That argument looks a lot weaker after March 11, when a coordinated series of terrorist 
bomb attacks in Madrid on the eve of national elections killed nearly 200 people. At the 
time of writing most evidence pointed to Islamist extremists as the likely culprits. Yet, far 
from embracing Washington’s war on terror, Spaniards instead responded by removing 
America’s ally, Prime Minister José-María Aznar and his party, from power. The newly 
elected Socialist Prime Minister José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero wasted no time in 
promising to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. ‘You can’t organize a war with lies,’ he 
has been quoted as saying. ‘Blair and Bush must do some reflection and self-criticism.’ 
 
And so must many seasoned observers of European politics; the Spanish decision –and 
the dramatic scale of the suddenly un-Popular Party’s fall from power– took most analysts 
by surprise. It would be wrong to read too much into the reaction to the bombings –the 
voters seemed to be responding to a perceived cover-up by the Aznar government (which 
initially put the blame on the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA) rather than its 
handling of the Iraq crisis. Despite a 90% disapproval of the war in Iraq, the Spaniards 
seemed poised to forgive Aznar’s Conservative Party, which –up until the day of the 
bombing– led the then-opposition Socialists by a slim but firm margin. 
 
                                                 
 1
∗ Director of the Brussels office of the Center for Defense Information, an independent research 
organization specializing in security and defence affairs. 
Área: USA-Transatlantic Dialogue / Defence & Security / International Terrorism - ARI Nº 59/2004 
Fecha 03/30/2004 
 
But the turn of events should give us all a pause nevertheless. It points to two 
conclusions. The real issue is not September 11 but the Iraq war. Despite Washington’s 
intense public diplomacy campaign, European mass opinion –unlike America’s– sees Iraq 
and terrorism as two completely separate problems. To most Europeans, the Iraq war was 
not only unnecessary but might also have fueled terrorism by giving al-Qaeda a new 
cause and a new target. Seen in this light, the Spanish vote –which some pundits were 
quick to call appeasement– seems to have been more of a vote of no-confidence in the 
US definition of terrorism rather than an abdication to blackmail and violence. It is one 
thing to want to prevent future terrorist attacks but another to support policies which one 
believes make a bad situation worse. 
 
This brings us to the second point. The Spanish reaction proved just how badly the war 
has poisoned the well of US-European relations. The suspicions and the mistrust are 
spreading –what began as a difference over Iraq now threatens to affect joint operations 
against terrorist groups–. The frustrating truth is that regardless of whom one believes to 
be responsible, Iraq is a terrorism problem now. The paradox of Europe’s situation today 
is that it is difficult to argue that the US-led war turned Iraq into a terrorist haven while at 
the same time opting to stay out of –or withdraw from– the reconstruction process there. 
 
The stunning political repercussions of the Madrid bombings clearly brought the 
transatlantic relationship to a new low point. To many Europeans, the Madrid attacks 
seemed to justify all their fears about the direction of America’s foreign and security 
policies. The Spanish election results also gave European governments a massive 
disincentive to follow their US ally. The western coalition, which appeared to be 
recovering from the Iraq crisis, now seems more brittle than ever. 
 
This is an anxious moment. To those in Europe who remember the horrors of 
totalitarianism, it brings to mind the ‘midnight knock’ dilemma. It refers to choices before 
individuals who have just seen their neighbour dragged away by the secret police in the 
middle of the night. What do you do? One can choose to lay low, keep quiet and hope that 
the next visit comes to someone else. The downside is that those perpetrating horrors are 
allowed to roam freely. It also means that they may come for you in the future, and if they 
do, you should not expect help. 
 
One can also choose to speak out, to demand an end to the atmosphere of fear. In that 
case, one of two things usually follows –if no one else speaks out, the secret police is 
certain to come for the dissenter. This is the worst of all outcomes. If –and only if– 
everybody speaks out is there a hope of ending the horror. This, needless to say, is the 
best possible outcome. 
 
This was Spain’s and Europe’s dilemma right after the attacks of September 11. Europe 
clearly made the right choice, joining with the US to fight sources of new catastrophic 
terrorism. European forces have fought in Afghanistan and European ships search 
cargoes around the world for weapons of mass destruction that may be related to 
terrorism. The continent’s police forces foiled numerous terrorist plans, including attacks 
on US targets in Europe. There can be no talk of appeasement and abdication. 
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But the real world does not offer neat and simple choices. The Iraq war cast doubts on 
America’s case. To continue the ‘midnight knock’ analogy, the US –on whom the secret 
police called first– turns out to have had troubled relations with its neighbours lately. 
When hurt, it lashed out against a party with only a tenuous link to the original injury. And 
now one of its friends –Spain– has itself been visited by the grim reaper. It was inevitable 
that a moment of hesitation and re-assessment would follow. The challenge now is to 
disentangle opposition to Iraq from cooperation on terrorism; to restate the definition of 
causes and nature of terrorism and to agree on basic principles. 
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The Way Forward After Madrid 
 
The post-Madrid tensions show just how useless the concept of terrorism is for 
international relations. As the US author and political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski 
recently argued: ‘Terrorism is a technique for killing people. That can’t be an enemy. It’s 
as if we said that World War II was not against the Nazis but against blitzkrieg.’ The sheer 
breadth of the ‘war on terrorism’, no doubt, is useful in political terms: it allows just about 
any measure to be defended in its name. But that approach carries its drawbacks: 
transatlantic differences over ‘optional’ portions of the campaign such as Iraq (certainly 
Europe’s view) now threaten the cooperation on essential parts of the campaign against 
perpetrators of terrorism. 
 
More clarity on the nature of the terrorist threat –and on corresponding responses– is now 
in order. Three questions in particular help frame the debate –and the US-European 
differences– on terrorism. 
 
(1) Is the West Facing an Existential Threat? 
 
An agreement on the gravity of the threat is important because the stakes determine the 
means. If a government believes terrorism to be a problem that can be mostly or fully 
addressed through a political solution, it will be more reluctant to make it a priority and to 
potentially treat its sources with radical means such as the use of force. There is little 
doubt the US views the newly emerged Jihadi terrorism in existential terms but do 
European countries share the sense of urgency? Or, breaking down the question to its 
component parts, will the Islamist militants have a reason to curb their violence against 
US and European targets? And if they do opt for maximum possible damage, will the 
terrorists be able to acquire the means to present an existential threat to Western 
civilization? 
 
On the first count, US views mostly overlap with those of its European allies, with a few 
subtle differences. Countries on both sides of the Atlantic share a realization that the 
demands of the extreme elements of radical Islam will and should not be met. In the 
words of EU High Representative Javier Solana: ‘There is a fanatical fringe who are 
beyond political discourse.’ Nor is there any indication that the other side wants to 
negotiate: the perpetrators of the World Trade Center and Madrid attacks must have 
known that their acts would kill any hope of political legitimacy for the Jihadi goals in 
Europe or the US. 
 
The allies partly disagree on the role of the Israeli occupation of Palestine in fuelling 
terrorist attacks against US and European targets. Virtually all European countries also 
fault the US for the perceived failure to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. At 
the same time, however, all EU and NATO members agree that the key to preventing 
future terrorism lies mainly in making the Middle East more open, more prosperous and 
more democratic. And they seem willing to accelerate their initiatives in this regard (the 
Barcelona process and the Greater Middle East) irrespective of the status of the Israeli-
Palestinian discussions. The corrosive impact of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute on 
transatlantic relations is thus limited. 
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Could terrorists acquire the means to cripple the West’s economic and political life 
through an attack using nuclear or biological weapons? The short answer is that no one in 
the coalition is taking chances. The US and Europe, even as their political relations sank 
to their low point in 2003, have actually managed to carve out a quite fruitful cooperation 
in stopping the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new Proliferation 
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Security Initiative (PSI) is up and running, and the respective EU and US 
counterproliferation doctrines read like carbon copies of each other. At the time of writing, 
the UN Security Council is ready to take up a resolution banning the distribution of 
weapons of mass destruction and related technology; a crucial component of those 
respective doctrines. 
 
(2) Do the Military Have a Role in the Campaign Against Terrorism? 
 
The question of the use of force in the campaign against terrorism tends to play an 
unnecessarily controversial role. Many Europeans react to US over-reliance on military 
power by creating a security vision based on nearly wholesale rejection of force. The 
President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, played to these sentiments when 
he told Italian newspaper La Stampa on 15 March that ‘using force is not the answer to 
resolving the conflict with terrorists’. But inasmuch as his words seem to rule out any 
application of military power against terrorism, they are in fact quite unrepresentative of 
the view of most European governments. 
 
By all indications, the disagreement with the US lies not with force as a tool but rather its 
application. The toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was endorsed and actively 
supported by Europe. Spain sent 120 peacekeepers to Afghanistan, and paid a high price, 
too: 61 tragically died in a May 2003 plane crash. More recently, Prime Minister-designate 
Zapatero also hinted that Spanish troops departing from Iraq may be posted to 
Afghanistan instead, thus affirming Spain’s commitment to the mission there. 
 
Admittedly, disagreements over Iraq, which divided Europe right down the middle, point to 
limitations to allied use of force in the future. Regime change, even as a part of the 
campaign against terrorism, will be a tough sell. It would be guaranteed to face close legal 
scrutiny, and potential allies would first need to be satisfied that the post-war situation 
would not lead to disproportionate chaos and instability. Similarly, Iraq made it more 
difficult for any country to argue for a preventive strike against suspected manufacturers 
or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Inevitably, one would seriously question 
the intelligence being used to justify the strikes, and there would also have to be far more 
clarity of purpose than was the case in Iraq for a wide coalition to come together. 
 
But none of this should be interpreted as a psychological divide between Europe and the 
US on the issue of the use of use of force. Differences yes, but of degree and application 
rather than over the use of military power. 
 
(3) Is Iraq Part of the Struggle Against Terrorism? 
 
Beyond a doubt it is now, however uneasily the realization sits alongside the popular 
opposition in Europe to the war. The governments that are not part of the reconstruction 
effort there face difficult choices. Joining the coalition means risking casualties and 
appearing to legitimize the US war; there could also be a political price to pay at home 
from electorates opposed to US actions in the Middle East. At the same time, terrorism of 
the same Jihadi mould that spawned the Madrid attacks has clearly moved into Iraq. 
Europe, too, now stands to lose if the Iraqis and the Americans fail to build a viable post-
Saddam government and state apparatus. The challenge is to find an arrangement that 
combines the European desire for more legitimacy for the Iraqi reconstruction process 
with the larger need to deny terrorists a new sanctuary. José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero 
hinted at such a compromise in linking the continued presence of Spanish troops in Iraq to 
a robust UN mandate. 
 
 4
Conclusion: The paragraphs above are not meant to offer definitive answers, merely to 
frame the debate which must take place between the allies. While it sounds like a worn 
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cliché, the reality is that the West is far stronger together than divided. Even more 
seriously, neither side is able to deal with terrorism effectively without aid from its allies. 
This is particularly true of the intelligence and investigative dimensions of the campaign, 
and in cases where the use of hard military power might be required. It will be important 
for both sides to focus on commonalities in the threat assessment, and to craft a joint 
response. 
 
The outline of continued cooperation is clearly visible. The US and Europe share the 
sense that catastrophic terrorism represents the gravest security challenge since the end 
of the Cold War. They worry that we might not have seen the worst of it, and cooperate 
closely on stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And they are willing to go 
to great lengths –including the use of military force– to prevent future attacks. They also 
agree that the greater Middle East must be more democratic and offer better living 
conditions to its young population. 
 
The Western coalition has never been of a single mind; its strength historically lay in its 
willingness to work towards convergence in the allies’ respective strategies. Some of the 
unity inevitably disappeared when NATO’s common enemy –the Soviet Union– collapsed. 
But beyond a certain point, the growing distance between the allies weakens both parties, 
and nothing would please their common enemy more than seeing the Western alliance fall 
apart in acrimony. One definition of terrorism describes it as ‘political violence designed to 
communicate grievances and to have psychological effects beyond the immediate target.’ 
One of the desired effects of the Madrid bombing, based on preliminary evidence, was 
precisely to splinter the Western alliance. It behoves the allies to see through the trap, to 
acknowledge mistakes made under the banner of ‘war on terror,’ and to produce a stricter 
definition of the threat manifested by terrorism and a new strategy for fighting its sources. 
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